{"id":127566,"date":"2026-08-04T12:59:52","date_gmt":"2026-08-04T12:59:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/?p=127566"},"modified":"2026-08-04T13:00:51","modified_gmt":"2026-08-04T13:00:51","slug":"hormuz-strait-has-it-become-irans-last-card-to-buy-time","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/hormuz-strait-has-it-become-irans-last-card-to-buy-time\/","title":{"rendered":"Hormuz Strait… Has It Become Iran’s Last Card to Buy Time?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Between Diplomacy and Escalation… How Is Iran Using Time as a Tool in Its Confrontation with Washington?<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Tensions between the United States and Iran continue to escalate amid growing regional instability, with both sides exchanging accusations over the future of diplomatic negotiations. While Washington accuses Tehran of pursuing a policy of deception and delay, Iran insists that indirect contacts through the Sultanate of Oman remain ongoing, reflecting the continuation of communication channels despite the intensifying political and military confrontation.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as one of Tehran’s most significant sources of leverage in the face of U.S. pressure. Speaking on Sky News Arabia’s Al-Tasea program, Iranian affairs expert Aref Nasr argued that ambiguity and strategic procrastination form the two main pillars of Iran’s approach to managing its conflict with the United States, noting that Tehran is betting on exhausting its adversaries rather than seeking a rapid resolution.<\/p>\n

Dual Messaging and a Strategy of Attrition<\/strong><\/h3>\n

According to Nasr, Iran’s current policy involves managing several parallel tracks simultaneously. Tehran delivers one message to the United States, another to regional mediators, while its military and field activities frequently contradict its diplomatic rhetoric.<\/p>\n

He describes this approach as an extension of the so-called “madman strategy,” which aims to convince opponents that Iran’s actions are unpredictable, thereby enhancing its ability to maneuver. In his view, Iran regards negotiations primarily as a tool for managing external pressure rather than reaching a final settlement, believing that Washington likewise uses diplomacy as a means of containing the crisis while increasing political and military pressure.<\/p>\n

Nasr argues that this strategy is deeply rooted in the doctrine associated with former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, which, according to his assessment, enjoyed the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and is based on expanding the scope of confrontation whenever Iran comes under direct pressure.<\/p>\n

He explains that this doctrine rests on three main pillars. The first is prolonging conflicts and turning time into a tool of attrition against opponents seeking quick results. The second is broadening the battlefield through multiple regional arenas\u2014including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon\u2014thereby dispersing the efforts of Iran’s adversaries. The third involves relying on asymmetric warfare by using relatively inexpensive missiles and drones against far more costly American military systems, increasing the financial and operational burden on the opposing side.<\/p>\n

Nasr believes that Iranian diplomacy is currently attempting to preserve this approach while avoiding a full-scale confrontation whose consequences could prove unpredictable.<\/p>\n

Hormuz… Iran’s Last Leverage and the Limits of U.S. Options<\/strong><\/h3>\n

According to Nasr, delaying tactics have become a central component of Iran’s strategy, as Tehran hopes that future political developments\u2014including upcoming Israeli elections or U.S. midterm elections\u2014could reshape the balance of power and alter domestic political pressures in both Washington and Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n

Within this context, he considers the Strait of Hormuz to be Iran’s most influential bargaining chip, particularly after the decline of several of its regional instruments of influence. He cites statements by Iranian officials, including Kazem Gharibabadi, who argued that the recent crisis had once again highlighted the strategic importance of the strait, as well as remarks by Mohsen Rezaei, who described Hormuz as “a nuclear bomb in Iran’s hands.”<\/p>\n

Nasr believes Tehran is using the possibility of disrupting maritime security\u2014and linking the Strait of Hormuz to other strategic waterways\u2014as a means of raising the cost of any potential military confrontation, strengthening its negotiating position, and maintaining pressure on the international community.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, he argues that Washington’s options remain largely confined to two primary paths: returning to the negotiating table or resuming military strikes. He notes that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) does not view either option as an existential threat to the Iranian regime.<\/p>\n

Nasr contends that the only scenario capable of fundamentally altering Tehran’s calculations would be the launch of a large-scale ground invasion. He describes such a scenario as a “red line” for the Iranian leadership because of its potential to trigger domestic instability, deepen ethnic and social divisions within the country, and undermine the cohesion of Iran’s military establishment.<\/p>\n

At the same time, he points out that implementing such a scenario remains highly complex, as the United States has so far failed to build the international consensus necessary to support such an operation given its political and military consequences.<\/p>\n

Assessing current U.S. and Israeli military strategy, Nasr says that recent strikes have focused on missiles, drones, air defense systems, and radar installations. However, he argues that a greater strategic impact would result from targeting the leadership responsible for Iran’s political and military decision-making, noting that much of Iran’s strategic capability is housed in heavily fortified facilities that cannot easily be destroyed through airstrikes alone.<\/p>\n

Nasr concludes that Washington appears determined to avoid repeating the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, instead pursuing a strategy that relies more heavily on exploiting Iran’s internal divisions. He suggests that strikes targeting locations in the Ahvaz region\u2014particularly those connected to Iranian ground forces\u2014may indicate preparations for a range of possible military scenarios alongside growing domestic pressure on the Iranian government, while emphasizing that this assessment represents political and military analysis rather than confirmed fact.<\/p>\n

United News Network (UNN Arabic)<\/strong><\/p>\n

An independent media platform providing reliable news and objective analysis while promoting peace and cultural dialogue around the world to convey the truth and build bridges of understanding between peoples.<\/p>\n

For more news, visit our homepage:<\/p>\n

https:\/\/un-news.org<\/a><\/p>\n

Author:<\/strong> Counselor Faisal Al-Mutairi<\/p>\n

Publication Date:<\/strong> August 4, 2026<\/p>\n

Last Updated:<\/strong> August 2026<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Between Diplomacy and Escalation… How Is Iran Using Time as a Tool in Its Confrontation with Washington? Tensions between the United States and Iran continue to escalate amid growing regional instability, with both sides exchanging accusations over the future of diplomatic negotiations. While Washington accuses Tehran of pursuing a policy of deception and delay, Iran […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":127565,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"tmauthors":[74],"class_list":{"0":"post-127566","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world-news"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127566","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=127566"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127566\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":127573,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127566\/revisions\/127573"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/127565"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=127566"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=127566"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=127566"},{"taxonomy":"tmauthors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/un-news.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tmauthors?post=127566"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}