Despite Iranian officials’ insistence that their country is indifferent to the U.S. congressional midterm elections scheduled for November 3, 2026, and that its positions are determined solely by its national interests, official statements and analyses in local media, along with U.S. and international reports, reveal that Tehran is closely monitoring the vote. Iran views the elections as a factor that could influence U.S. President Donald Trump’s calculations, the future of the military confrontation, and the course of negotiations between the two countries.
The elections matter to Iran not only because Republicans could lose their majorities in Congress, but also because of the potential political and oversight pressures this could place on the Trump administration and the resulting reduction in its domestic room for maneuver. The impact of the war and its economic costs on American voters is another consideration.
However, a Republican loss of congressional control would not necessarily strip the U.S. president of his authority to conduct foreign policy or make military decisions.
On September 27, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview with U.S. network NBC News that Tehran was not concerned with U.S. elections or similar issues, stressing that its only concern was its national interests. He added that Iran was ready for diplomacy, while also being fully prepared to face “any challenge or aggression.”
Araghchi’s remarks are significant because they came in response to a direct question about the midterm elections, rather than as part of a general discussion of relations with Washington. Although he declared that his country was indifferent to the elections, he emphasized Iran’s readiness for military confrontation while keeping the door open to negotiations.
In an interview with German public broadcaster ARD, carried by Iranian media on October 25, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei commented on Trump’s statement that he would not attack Iran before the midterm elections. Asked whether he trusted that pledge, Baghaei said the statement revealed that attacking Iran had been part of the U.S. strategy. He stressed that Tehran must be prepared for all possibilities, given that Iran had previously been subjected to U.S. attacks during earlier rounds of negotiations.
The exchange shows that the elections have featured directly in Iranian discussions about the timing of any potential U.S. attack, even as Iranian officials avoid describing them as a decisive factor in their own decision-making.
On October 17, former Iranian foreign minister and parliamentarian Manouchehr Mottaki published an article predicting a Republican defeat, describing election day as “a bitter day for Trump and his team.” He argued that the results would reveal the extent of the political decline facing the U.S. president and that the elections represented an opportunity to hold his administration accountable for the war and its consequences.
Two days later, the conservative newspaper Kayhan published an article by conservative writer Saadollah Zarei examining the war’s impact on American public opinion and linking voters’ attitudes toward the confrontation to the Republicans’ electoral prospects. The writer cited a poll attributed to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, presenting figures on Americans’ rejection of the war’s costs and their views on its continuation. The accuracy of these figures could not be independently verified.
These statements and articles reflect a tendency among Iran’s conservative camp to portray the elections as a referendum on Trump’s performance and an opportunity to demonstrate that the war has failed to achieve its stated objectives, while its costs could become an electoral liability for Republicans.
Predictions of a Republican defeat have not been confined to media commentary. Iranian analysts have also linked the loss of a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate to an increased ability by Trump’s opponents to question his administration, exert pressure on it, and obstruct some of its priorities.
In this context, Nour News, which is close to circles within Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, published an analysis on October 29 by writer and analyst Amir Ali Abolfath titled “The U.S. Elections and Their Impact on the War with Iran.” The article argued that the November 3 elections were not merely a contest for congressional seats, but also represented “a test of how satisfied Americans are with the performance of the Trump administration.”
The analysis noted that a Republican loss of its majority “could pave the way for tougher congressional oversight, investigations, and political pressure on the president.” At the same time, it clarified that this would not necessarily bring military operations to a halt, given the broad powers the U.S. president enjoys in foreign policy and military command.
Media coverage in Iran has also followed the elections closely, extending beyond official statements and political commentary. On October 20, Tasnim News Agency published an explainer on how the midterm elections work and the importance of the contests for seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, alongside political and economic indicators influencing voter preferences. This reflects the Iranian media’s interest in the elections ahead of the vote.
On October 31, Nour News published a report titled “Will a Republican Defeat Affect Trump’s Decision?” It presented two differing assessments attributed to unnamed U.S. officials. While one argued that the election results would not change Trump’s decisions regarding Iran, the other predicted that a Republican defeat could prompt the U.S. president to order a military operation against the country.
The report pointed out that these assessments came from unidentified U.S. officials, not Iranian officials, using them to illustrate the differing views on how the elections could affect the course of the confrontation.
For his part, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesperson Hossein Mohebi spoke at a press conference on September 29 about a message the Guards had addressed to the American people, calling on the media to convey its contents to the public. The message focused on the costs of U.S. wars, military spending, and the impact of foreign policy on taxpayers. It also urged Americans to hold their government accountable for its priorities.
Alongside Iran’s public rhetoric, international reports have revealed other calculations in Tehran concerning the elections. On October 20, Reuters published a report based on statements from three senior Iranian officials and an informed Iranian source, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity.
They said Tehran was deliberately prolonging the deadlock in negotiations with Washington to deny Trump a political achievement that he could present to voters ahead of the November 3 elections. The report quoted one Iranian official as saying that “the ruling establishment does not want to give the U.S. president a political victory.”
Iranian analyst Saeed Laylaz also argued that prolonging negotiations would allow Iran to influence the U.S. elections without resorting to any illegal action.
In the same context, The Washington Post reported on October 18 that Iranian officials had viewed the weeks leading up to the elections as an opportunity to pressure Trump by raising the costs of confrontation and disrupting energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
The report noted that some Iranian officials hoped to inflict political damage on Trump similar to that suffered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during the Iran hostage crisis between 1979 and 1981.
These reports take on added significance in light of Reuters’ October 31 account of a meeting between Iranian negotiators and Qatari mediators in Doha, following lengthy discussions in Tehran, in an attempt to find a way to end the war. The report also pointed to concerns that Trump might resume military strikes after the midterm elections.
The report quoted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio as saying that Trump had not made a final decision on the military option and preferred the diplomatic track, while keeping military action among the options under consideration.
Taken together, these positions and reports reveal a clear contrast between Iran’s public rhetoric and its actual calculations. While Araghchi insisted that his country was indifferent to the U.S. elections, and Iranian officials avoided presenting them as a determining factor in Iranian policy, Baghaei’s remarks, articles by Mottaki and Zarei, analyses by Abolfath, and extensive media coverage indicate that the outcome is receiving considerable political and media attention in Iran.
Tehran is betting that a Republican loss of its majorities could increase domestic pressure on Trump, strengthen congressional oversight of his administration, and limit his ability to portray the war as a political success. It also believes that continued increases in energy costs and economic disruption, in the absence of a political settlement, could turn the confrontation into an electoral liability for the U.S. president.
However, the impact of this bet remains limited at the executive level. A Republican loss of its congressional majorities would not diminish Trump’s military and executive powers, nor would it necessarily mean that Washington would abandon its options toward Iran. On the contrary, a decline in domestic political support could prompt the president to take swift military or political steps to demonstrate resolve either before or after the elections.
Thus, for Tehran, the November 3 elections are more than an American contest to change the composition of Congress. They are a juncture at which calculations involving war, negotiations, sanctions, and energy markets intersect. Although Iran publicly insists that it is indifferent to the elections, statements by its officials, analyses in its media, and reports citing Iranian sources suggest that while the results may not determine the course of the confrontation on their own, they have become part of Tehran’s calculations regarding the timing, cost, and eventual outcome of the conflict.
United News Network – UNN Arabic
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Author: Counselor Faisal Al-Mutairi.
Publication Date: November 1, 2026.
Updated: October 2026.
